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AbSTRACT
The aim of the study is to reveal if there is a coordination of fiscal and monetary policies in Armenia, as well as to assess 
its impact on economic growth in the country. Methods used: statistical analysis, logistic regressions, mathematical 
modeling. The authors analyzed the economic growth rates and annual GDP growth per capita in Armenia from 1990 to 
2018. They described the model of coordination of fiscal and monetary regulation. The relationship and interdependence 
between the monetary and fiscal regulation mechanisms are represented by mathematical equations. Provided are the 
calculations for the optimal values of fiscal and monetary indicators, as well as economic indicators for Nash equilibrium. 
The study results showed that fiscal and monetary regulation in Armenia is ineffective; there is no coordination of 
regulatory mechanisms, which is detrimental to the economic growth rate. The authors conclude that it is necessary 
to revise approaches to monetary and fiscal policies for a greater emphasis on coordination and harmonization of 
macroeconomic regulation instruments to ensure sustainable economic growth in the long term.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Цель исследования —  выявить наличие или отсутствие координации налогово-бюджетной и денежно-кредитной по-
литики в Армении, а также оценить степень ее воздействия на экономический рост в стране. Использованы методы: 
статистического анализа, построения логистических регрессий, математического моделирования. Проанализиро-
ваны темпы экономического роста и ежегодный прирост ВВП на душу населения в Армении с 1990 по 2018 г. Опи-
сана модель координации фискального и монетарного регулирования. Взаимосвязь и взаимозависимость между 
механизмами денежно-кредитного и налогово-бюджетного регулирования представлена в  виде математических 
уравнений. Рассчитаны оптимальные значения фискальных и монетарных показателей, а также индикаторы эконо-
мических целей по равновесию Нэша. Результаты исследования показали, что фискальное и монетарное регулиро-
вание в Армении можно считать неэффективными, отсутствует какая-либо координация механизмов регулирования, 
что негативно сказывается на темпах экономического роста. Авторы делают вывод о необходимости пересмотреть 
подходы к монетарной и фискальной политикам с точки зрения большего акцента на координации и гармонизации 
инструментов макроэкономического регулирования с целью обеспечения устойчивого роста экономики в долго-
срочной перспективе.
Ключевые слова: монетарное регулирование; фискальная политика; координация денежно-кредитной и налогово-
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INTRODUCTION
The main objective of state regulation is to achieve a 
high level of prosperity of the population. The expe-
rience of many countries shows that harmonization 
of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as the focus 
on sustainable economic growth, lead to an increase 
in the level and quality of life in the country. Besides 
the common goal, monetary and fiscal policies pur-
sue conflicting goals. Thus, public debt management 
always defeats the purpose of monetary regulation, 
aimed at ensuring price stability in the economy.
The theoretical and practical foundations of the 
balance between fiscal and monetary regulation are 
well disclosed in the world scientific literature. Yet, 
exploring a particular group of countries, various 
authors come to many contradictory conclusions. 
The main area of research is to find a compromise 
between GDP growth and unemployment, on the one 
hand, and ensuring stable and low inflation, on the 
other hand. Moreover, we take the hypothesis about 
the need to dominate in either fiscal or monetary 
policy as a basis.
As a rule, the theory states that the dominance 
of monetary regulation is preferable. However, the 
experience of some countries proves that the exces-
sive independence of the Central Bank and its focus 
on low inflation leads to a slowdown of economic 
growth. In this regard, the experience of Armenia is 
as a vivid example [1].
We think that the emphasis should be made on 
ensuring balanced and coordinated policy by the Cen-
tral Bank and the government, rather than on fiscal 
or monetary goals.
In the framework of this study, the task is to de-
termine a coordination model of monetary and fiscal 
regulation, which will consider the peculiarities of 
the Armenian economy, and will also be focused on 
ensuring sustainable economic growth rates.
lITERATURE REVIEW
A wide range of literature is devoted to the issues 
of coordination of monetary and fiscal policies, in-
cluding in terms of achieving higher and more sus-
tainable economic growth rates. It is obvious that 
both instruments of macroeconomic regulation 
frequently pursue contradictory tasks. In particular, 
the problem of public debt and its financing mecha-
nisms usually becomes an obstacle between fiscal 
and monetary policies. A high public debt can have 
a significant impact on the relationship between fis-
cal and monetary authorities [2]. Laurens and de la 
Piedra also point to public debt and budget deficits 
as a key factor in the interaction between fiscal and 
monetary policies [3]. They emphasize that the Cen-
tral Bank’s strategy can affect, for example, the ca-
pacity of the government to finance the budget defi-
cit by affecting the cost of debt service and by limit-
ing or expanding the available sources of financing.
Many authors considered the relationship be-
tween inflation and budget deficits. Thus, Sargent 
and Wallace [4] argued that in the short term, budget 
deficits should not cause inflation. However, in 2003, 
the study results by L. Katao and M. Terrones [5] 
spanning 107 countries over 42 years proved that 
the budget deficit has an impact on price changes 
not only during high- or hyperinflation, but also in 
its moderate ranges, even if the consequences in the 
second case are much weaker. The study showed a 
strong positive association between deficits and in-
flation among developing economies, but not among 
low-inflation advanced economies. On the other 
hand, many authors [6–8] argue that in the face of 
inflationary pressures caused by instability in world 
markets, the task of ensuring price stability comes to 
the fore. This fact puts monetary policy objectives in 
the foreground, which implies monetary dominance 
in the economy [9].
However, both authorities can influence economic 
growth. Both fiscal and monetary policies have a suf-
ficient range of instruments that could influence GDP 
elements. In this case, the main task is to find a bal-
ance between the goals and the policies of the central 
bank and fiscal authorities [10, 11].
Typically, coordination of monetary and fiscal pol-
icy is fraught with great difficulties. Christian Beddies 
[12] offers an approach to the coordination problem 
between monetary and fiscal policy. He divides all 
literature in this field into three strands: the first is 
the time inconsistency problem and suggestions for 
its solution; the second is the institutional models of 
monetary policy, and the third part is the interaction 
of fiscal and monetary authorities. As for the third 
part, he notes that with the inconsistent formation 
of two separate policies for regulating the economy, 
it is necessary to define common concepts in order to 
identify the results of the interaction between these 
policies. He also notes the importance of a compro-
mise between unemployment/GDP and inflation.
In his work, Alan Blinder (1982) [13] supplements 
the mentioned reasons with two more important 
factors: different ideas about objectives important 
for society and different forecasts about the likely 
affects of fiscal and/or monetary policy actions on 
the economy.
In this regard, finding a balance between fiscal 
and monetary policies is possible to a higher extent 
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by determining the most favorable positions in terms 
of economic growth and development.
There are several approaches to solving the prob-
lem of the interaction of monetary and fiscal regula-
tion in the literature. The first approach implies the 
absence of any interaction. At the same time, both 
fiscal and monetary policies are completely inde-
pendent from each other, and decision-making takes 
place without knowing each other’s decisions. In the 
scientific literature, this approach is known as the 
Cournot model [14].
The second approach, known as the Stackelberg 
model, involves the dominance of one of the tools of 
macroeconomic regulation, either fiscal or monetary 
policy [15]. The Cournot model is taken as a basis of 
this approach, but the assumption of the equality of 
macroeconomic regulation instruments is replaced by 
more realistic scenarios where one of the instruments 
is dominant. This approach involves the selection of 
the priority goals from the point of view of macro-
economic regulation, which relates to either fiscal or 
monetary policy.
Finally, the third approach involves the coor-
dination of fiscal and monetary policies to ensure 
economic growth [11]. By such coordination, we can 
understand the ongoing process of interaction be-
tween fiscal and monetary authorities, in order to 
solve the tasks of macroeconomic regulation. Some 
studies [3] prove that in the absence of coordination 
and matching goals of fiscal and monetary policies, a 
significant increase in interest rates is highly probable 
in the financial market or an increase in the country’s 
public debt in the economy.
In their study “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arith-
metic”, Sargent and Wallace [4] conclude that, given 
absolute rational expectations, a decrease in money 
supply growth can lead to higher inflation. In other 
words, the implementation of tight monetary and 
soft fiscal policies can lead to an increase in the in-
flationary background. At the same time, considering 
the cases of the dominance of one of the policies, the 
authors conclude that coordination of monetary and 
fiscal policies should be accompanied by a certain 
level of stimulation or restriction from regulatory 
instruments. It is only in this case, when it will lead 
to positive shifts in ensuring sustainable economic 
growth.
In her work “Equilibrium strategies in a fiscal-
monetary game. A simulation analysis” [16], Irena 
Woroniecka-Leciejewicz concluded that the actions 
of fiscal and monetary authorities have a positive 
impact on the economy provided that instruments 
are applied in a certain interval of values. The ef-
fectiveness of their actions decreases with very high 
or low values of instruments, which are the result of 
radically restrictive or expansive policy. The choice 
of the optimum fiscal policy depends upon the deci-
sion of monetary authorities, and this dependence is 
inversely proportional. That is, the more restrictive 
the monetary policy, the more expansive, in response, 
the fiscal policy, and vice versa. Similarly, the response 
of monetary authorities depends on fiscal policy. For 
example, carrying out an expansive monetary policy, 
the central bank must limit its policy to avoid an un-
desirable increase in inflation. However, this work is 
based on the assumption that monetary authorities 
want to achieve the desired level of inflation, and the 
fiscal ones seek economic growth.
Modern studies on the coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies place a great emphasis on the crisis 
conditions, which force to some extent the revision 
of the goals and objectives of both fiscal and mon-
etary policy [17]. In particular, the authors focus on 
the key issues of our time from the point of view of 
the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies. They 
note that the global financial crisis forced to rethink 
the role of the central bank in terms of solving fis-
cal problems, especially in the field of investments 
in state treasury bonds or setting negative interest 
rates on financial resources, which obviously affects 
the results of fiscal policy.
Other authors [18] considered the interaction be-
tween monetary and fiscal policies and used a data 
sample for the period from 1991 to 2016 for 42 coun-
tries, given the cyclical nature of monetary and fiscal 
policies. Countries were also classified by institutional 
and structural characteristics. The main conclusion 
made by the authors is that the implementation of 
inflation targeting, as well as the independence of 
“monetary authorities”, is usually due to counter-
cyclical monetary and fiscal policies, as well as co-
ordination between them.
Some analysts of the European Parliament have a 
totally new view [19]. In their opinion, the coordina-
tion of fiscal and monetary policies is only possible 
in theory, meaning that those responsible for mac-
roeconomic regulation should not try to achieve a 
balance between the two authorities.
Recent studies have examined fiscal and monetary 
policies in the context of economic stabilization [20–
22]. At the same time, the authors, for the most part, 
come to the conclusion that fiscal policy, rather than 
monetary policy, can become an economic growth 
driver. First of all, this conclusion is due to a reces-
sion in the global money market, negative interest 
rates and increased risks on world stock exchanges.
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However, in a developing economy, a poorly devel-
oped financial system, as well as high interest rates, 
coordination of fiscal and monetary policies is still 
relevant. In this regard, at the next stage of the study, 
we identified a model that is most adaptable to the 
conditions of the Armenian economy.
DESCRIPTION OF THE COORDINATION 
MODEl OF FISCAl AND MONETARY 
REGUlATION
As part of the study, we took the coordination model 
described in the study by Irena Woroniecka-Lecie-
jewicz “Equilibrium strategies in a fiscal-monetary 
game. A simulation analysis” (2015) [16]. She es-
timated the key parameters characterizing the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal or monetary policy instruments 
and analyzed the impact of monetary and fiscal reg-
ulation on key macroeconomic objectives. The main 
hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the 
budget deficit causes an increase in GDP growth.
The model consists of two logistic regressions 
that have the same independent and different de-
pendent variables that describe monetary and fiscal 
policies, and reveal the connection and interdepend-
ence between the mechanisms of monetary and fiscal 
regulation.
The original model consists of two equations:
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where y is inflation; p —  is economic growth; b —  is 
budget deficit growth; r —  is interest rate.
The calculation results of the parameters were 
presented by a matrix (see Table).
The matrix represents the correlation between 
inflation and economic growth, which in turn cor-
responds to the values of the interest rate and the 
budget deficit growth. The study by Irena Woroniecka-
Leciejewicz revealed a pattern according to which the 
lowest inflation and the lowest economic growth rates 
correspond to the most stringent restrictive measures 
of regulation, and conversely, high inflation and GDP 
growth were accompanied by expansive policy.
The study considers two cases:
•  in the first case, it is assumed that fiscal au-
thorities try to maximize GDP growth, while mon-
etary authorities try to minimize inflation;
•  in the second case, it is assumed that monetary 
and fiscal authorities determine specific goals, that 
is, the desired level of inflation and some planned 
GDP dynamics.
In the first case, fiscal authorities choose the op-
timal fiscal response i*(j) to each monetary strategy 
j, which maximizes the GDP growth rate. Monetary 
authorities act similarly: monetary authorities re-
spond with the corresponding strategy j*(i) to each 
strategy i chosen by fiscal authorities to minimize 
the inflation rate.
In such a situation, fiscal authorities have a domi-
nant strategy, which is the optimal response to the 
government, regardless of the decisions made by 
the central bank concerning the interest rate. The 
dominant strategy of fiscal authorities is the most 
expansive fiscal policy. Similarly, the most radically 
restrictive monetary policy is the dominant strategy 
for monetary authorities, which means the optimal 
one, no matter which fiscal strategy the government 
chooses.
Thus, the equilibrium in the game is achieved by 
dominant strategies that motivate the combination 
of the most restrictive monetary policy and the most 
expansive fiscal policy.
In the second case, we assumed that fiscal and 
monetary authorities try to minimize the deviations 
of GDP growth and inflation from the desired values 
of y* and p*. It is still assumed that for each monetary 
strategy j, fiscal authorities choose the optimal fiscal 
response i*(j), and for fiscal strategy i, monetary au-
thorities choose the optimal monetary response j*(i). 
Thus, the optimal responses of fiscal policy character-
ize the reaction of fiscal authorities to the potential 
moves of the central bank. Conversely, the optimal 
monetary responses describe the reaction of monetary 
authorities to various fiscal strategies.
For the case when fiscal and monetary authori-
ties want to minimize quadratic deviation from the 
desired values between real economic growth and 
inflation, the calculations were carried out under 
various assumptions. The location of the equilibrium 
point was no longer obvious and was dependent on 
the efficiency of fiscal and monetary policies, as well 
as on the priorities of the government and the central 
bank. In this study, we presented the results of the 
analysis corresponding to these two factors.
The table shows the optimal fiscal actions for each 
possible monetary policy, based on minimizing the 
quadratic deviation of GDP growth from the desired 
value. Similarly, it shows the optimal measures of 
monetary authorities, representing the optimal re-
sponse to potential fiscal strategies. Monetary policy 
limitation was dependent on the government’s choice 
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of fiscal policy. The wider the fiscal policy, the more 
restrictive is the monetary policy adopted by the 
central bank in response to avoid excessive inflation. 
Similarly, the optimal actions of monetary authorities 
represent a reaction to potential fiscal strategies. It 
should be noted that the limits imposed by monetary 
policy depends on the government’s choice of fiscal 
policy. The broader the fiscal policy, the more restric-
tive is the central bank’s monetary policy to avoid 
excessive inflation. Similarly, the restriction or ex-
pansion of fiscal policy depends on the central bank’s 
monetary policy. The more restrictive the monetary 
policy, the “broader” is the response by fiscal policy. 
Since the desired economic growth (at higher inter-
est rates) is achieved, a more expansive fiscal policy, 
characterized by a higher budget deficit, is required. 
Conversely, in respond to a broader monetary policy, 
the government pursues a correspondingly more re-
strictive policy.
Picture 1 shows the optimal values of fiscal and 
monetary indicators, as well as the indicators of 
economic objectives for Nash equilibrium (GDP 
growth = 3.5%, CPI = 2.5%).
The author admits minor, close to zero, changes 
to the fiscal policy instrument (Δbi) and the monetary 
policy instrument (Δrj). Due to the illustrated wider 
range of changes in their values, the specifics of the 
impact on the economy, including GDP growth and 
inflation, are more evident. Within a certain range 
of values of fiscal and monetary policy instruments, 
called “effective” values, the influence of instruments 
on the economy is tangible and corresponds to the 
equilibrium in the fiscal-monetary game. You can also 
notice that, within the effective range of values of 
mixed-policy instruments, the choice of the optimal 
fiscal policy depends on the decision of monetary 
authorities: as already mentioned, the more restric-
tive the monetary policy is, the more expansive the 
fiscal policy becomes, and vice versa.
However, outside this range, when fiscal authorities 
are prone, for example, to radically restrictive policies, 
the optimal response of the other no longer changes 
under the influence of further radicalization of mon-
etary policy of the central bank. For example, if one 
moves toward an extremely broad monetary policy, 
the optimal fiscal response will no longer respond to a 
further weakening of monetary policy. To summarize, 
we can say that in countries with extremely limiting 
or extremely wide interest rate strategies, the optimal 
fiscal response turns into a dominant strategy.
ANAlYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF MONETARY AND FISCAl REGUlATION 
IN ARMENIA
The effectiveness of monetary and fiscal regulation 
determines the effectiveness of the entire macroeco-
Table
Monetary-fiscal game —  Payoff matrix
Government —  fiscal policy
Central bank —  monetary policy
←Restrictive Expansive→
Monetary strategy M1 
(interest rate r1)
Monetary strategy M2 
(interest rate r2)
…
Monetary strategy Mn 
(interest rate rn)
←
 R
es
tr
ic
tiv
e 
Ex
pa
ns
iv
e 
→
Fiscal strategy F1 (budget 
deficit b1)
p11 p12 … p1n
y11 y12 …
y1n
Fiscal strategy F2 (budget 
deficit b2)
p21 p22 … p2n
y21 y22 …
y2n
…
Fiscal strategy Fm (budget 
deficit bm)
pm1 pm2 …
pmn
ym1 ym2 …
ymn
Source: [18, p. 76].
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nomic policy in the country. In fact, the welfare of the 
population directly reflects the effectiveness of fiscal 
and monetary policies. In turn, effective policy of fiscal 
and monetary authorities is essential for the coordina-
tion of these instruments of macroeconomic regulation.
However, Armenia’s experience indicates little suc-
cess in achieving both sustainable economic growth 
and higher GDP per capita. As we can see in Fig. 2, 
the last decade was accompanied by a recession. In 
particular, there is slow economic growth, as well as 
a lack of growth in per capita income. As mentioned 
above, the effectiveness of both fiscal and monetary 
policies directly affects economic growth in general.
Considering the abovesaid, we will first analyze 
the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary regulation 
in Armenia.
 
Fig. 1. Optimum fiscal and monetary strategies
Source: [10, p. 85].
Fig. 2. Economic growth rate in the Republic of Armenia (in %) and GDP per capita (in USD)
Source: Database of the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia. URL: https://www.armstat.am/ru/ (accessed on 
20.01.2020).
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ANAlYSIS OF FISCAl POlICY 
INDICATORS IN ARMENIA
A key indicator of the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
a developing economy is a balanced state budget. A 
negative balance is usually the result of inefficient 
budget allocation, as well as fiscal policy. Of course, 
a negative budget balance is an inherent part of 
the modern economy of almost all countries of the 
world. With rare exceptions, almost all countries to-
day are characterized by a budget deficit.
However, when it comes to developed economies, 
a negative budget balance, as a rule, does not entail 
further negative outcomes. In most cases, the budget 
deficit is covered by domestic public debt, which in 
general, to some extent, even has positive outcomes. 
For example, the development of the financial sector 
in the country.
A negative budget balance in a developing economy 
have different outcomes. The budget deficit is usually 
covered by external sources of credit, which leads to 
negative outcomes, including a slowdown in economic 
growth in the long term.
In this sense, the experience of Armenia is a prime 
example. The chronic budget deficit over the past 
23 years has been accompanied by a steady increase 
in external public debt. As we can see in Fig. 3, the 
highest budget deficit is observed in the period of 
1998–2002, as well as from 2009 up to this day.
Since 2009, the public debt of Armenia, both 
internal and external, has been characterized by 
constant growth (see Fig. 4). As of 2018, the total 
public debt was 55.7% of GDP and almost reached 
the critical value established by the Armenian Con-
stitution. The external debt amounted to 44.5% of 
GDP, which is the dominant position in the total 
debt of the country.
However, these are not the only indicators that 
speak of an unhealthy system of public finance in the 
Fig. 3. State budget of the Republic of Armenia, % of GDP
Source: Database of the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia. URL: https://www.armstat.am/ru/ (accessed on 
20.01.2020).
Fig. 4. Public debt of the Republic of Armenia (in % of GDP)
Source: Database of the National Statistical Service of RA. URL: https://www.armstat.am/ru/ (accessed on 20.01.2020).
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country. The key issues of fiscal regulation include 
the dominance of indirect taxes in the structure of 
budget tax revenues, the not-so-efficient tax admin-
istration system, the inflexible system of tax burden 
distribution, and many other problems. It should be 
noted that the list of the reasons for the insolvency 
of Armenia’s fiscal policy is not complete; however, 
it includes key factors that lead to a slowdown in 
economic growth over the past ten years.
ANAlYSIS OF ARMENIAN 
MONETARY POlICY
The Central Bank of Armenia pursues inflation 
targeting policy for thirteen years. The nominal 
anchor of monetary policy has been reviewed only 
three times since 2006, and at the initial imple-
mentation stage of the inflation targeting policy. 
Fig.5 illustrates the implementation results of 
monetary regulation by the Central Bank of Arme-
nia within the inflation targeting. As we can see, 
neither the actual value of the cumulative Con-
sumer Price Index, nor Core Inflation (the main 
target of the Central Bank of Armenia) fall into 
the target range during most of the periods under 
consideration (see Fig. 5). Thus, it is difficult to 
talk about the successful implementation of the 
inflation targeting policy due to the dynamics of 
inflation indicators in Armenia [23].
The study proves that the current policy has a 
negative effect on economic growth, especially in the 
last decade (see Fig. 6). In particular, foreign exchange 
regulation, which is aimed to maintain stable dynam-
ics of the exchange rate of the Armenian dram, led to 
a slowdown in economic growth, as well as to many 
other negative structural outcomes in the country’s 
economy [1, 24].
We cannot call Armenia’s monetary regulation 
efficient.
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Fig. 5. Central bank of Armenia’s target and the actual value of the CPI, %, quarterly
Source: Database of the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia. URL: https://www.cba.am/ru (accessed on 20.01.2020).
Fig. 6. Economic growth and exchange rate USD/AMD, 1993–2018
Source: Database of the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia. URL: https://www.cba.am/ru, Database of the National Statistical 
Service of the Republic of Armenia URL: https://www.armstat.am/ru/ (accessed on 20.01.2020).
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One of the reasons for the inefficiency of the 
policies implemented both by the Central Bank of 
Armenia and fiscal authorities is the lack of balance 
and coordination between these two instruments of 
macroeconomic policy. Thus, it seems relevant to 
estimate coordination of fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. In this regard, the objective of the study was to 
estimate coordination of monetary and fiscal policies 
in Armenia.
ADAPTATION OF THE COORDINATION 
MODEl OF FISCAl 
AND MONETARY REGUlATION.  
CASE OF ARMENIA
We took two regression equations as a basis for the 
coordination model of monetary and fiscal regula-
tion in Armenia. Here, the dynamics of the Dram 
exchange rate is the dependent variable character-
izing monetary regulation, and the dynamics of the 
GDP growth rate of the Republic of Armenia is the 
indicator of fiscal policy effectiveness.
The quarterly data from 2004 to the first quarter 
of 2019 of the following indicators served as the da-
tabase for the Armenian economic model: exchange 
rate —  AMD/USD, GDP, foreign debt, direct investment, 
remittances, export and import in absolute terms of 
the CPI *. All data adjusted for seasonality. Then we 
logarithmed the data and calculated the first differ-
ences; we checked the data for normality of distribu-
tion by the Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests 
(see Appendix, Table 1).
At the first stage of the study, as was mentioned 
above, the Consumer Price Index and External Debt 
were taken for independent variables. The regression 
analysis helped obtain the following equations:
       1) ExR = const —  b1*CPI —  b2*ED Equation;  (1)
       2) GDP = const + c1*CPI —  c2*ED Equation.  (2)
However, the regression analysis revealed that 
the External Debt in both models is an insignificant 
variable, since at the significance level of 5%, the 
hypothesis that the coefficient b2 is 0 is confirmed 
with a probability of 25.5% for Equation (1) (see Ap-
pendix, Table 2), and with a probability of 46.5% for 
Equation (2) (see Appendix, Table 3). For a model with 
a dependent variable Exchange Rate of Dram at the 
significance level of 5%, the CPI is insignificant with a 
probability of 92.5%, and for Equation (2), the regres-
sor is significant at the significance level of 10%, with 
a probability of 8.9%. Thus, it was proved that changes 
in the External Debt of Armenia do not affect either 
the country’s GDP or the dynamics of the national 
currency, and with the probability higher than 90%, 
inflation does not affect the country’s exchange rate.
In this regard, the independent variables were 
changed to Private Cash Transfers and Direct Invest-
ments.
   1) ExR = const + b1*Trans —  b2*D. Inv Equation; (3)
   2) GDP= const + c1*Trans + c2*D. Inv Equation.  (4)
The new model revealed that Direct Investment 
with a probability of 46.6% for the first (Equation 3) 
(see Appendix, Table 4) and with that of 26.7% for the 
second regression is an insignificant regressor, and 
Transfers is an insignificant factor in Equation 4 (see 
Appendix, Table 5).
At the next stage, we carried out another regres-
sion analysis, including the following independent 
variables: External Debt, CPI, Direct Investment, 
Transfers, Exports, and Imports (see Appendix, Ta-
bles 6 and 7).
We compared both models with the main indi-
cators of fiscal and monetary policies at the sig-
nificance level of 10%. As a result, no indicators 
were identified that would have an impact on both 
monetary regulation indicators and fiscal policy 
indicators in Armenia.
CONClUSIONS
The analysis carried out in this work allowed us to 
formulate the following main conclusions:
Considering the growth indicators of the Arme-
nian economy, as well as the per capita income, it is 
possible to question the effectiveness of the imple-
mentation of both fiscal and monetary policies in 
the country. At the same time, the analysis shows 
that the results of both fiscal and monetary policies 
negatively affect the rate of economic growth. In 
particular, high public debt, as well as the structure 
of revenues and expenditures of the state budget, 
have been a significant factor in slowing down the 
economy for at least the last ten years. On the other 
hand, tight monetary regulation, which restrains the 
growth of money supply in the last ten years, also 
negatively affects the achievement of sustainable 
and long-term rates of economic growth.
On the example of Armenia, the coordination mod-
el of monetary and fiscal policies showed no depend-
ence between all the considered factors. This, in turn, 
indicates non-market regulatory mechanisms present 
both in fiscal regulation and the Central Bank’s policy, 
M. A. Voskanyan, L. V. Paronyan
* The source: Data base of the Central Bank of Armenia. 
URL: https://www.cba.am (accessed on 20.01.2020).
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and on the other hand, indicates the lack of coordi-
nation between the two regulators of the economy 
at present. Summarizing the model analysis results, 
the following can be noted: changes in external debt, 
inflation, and foreign direct investment flows do not 
affect the exchange rate volatility of the dram, but 
the volume of transfers to the country affects it. In 
addition, neither external debt, nor inflation, foreign 
direct investment, nor transfers affect the country’s 
GDP growth rate. Analysis of coordination of monetary 
and fiscal regulation in Armenia showed that at this 
stage, policies are unbalanced, which means they 
cannot contribute to sustainable economic growth 
in the near future.
The conclusion is that a need was proved to re-
view the implementation of monetary and fiscal 
policies in Armenia in terms of both relevance and 
the allocation of the key and common objective to 
achieve sustainable economic growth in Armenia 
in the long term.
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        trans           60    0.96632      1.831     1.303    0.09624
         imp           60    0.98578      0.773    -0.555    0.71057
         exp           60    0.98260      0.946    -0.120    0.54760
          di           60    0.97274      1.482     0.848    0.19827
         cpi           60    0.98629      0.745    -0.634    0.73691
          ed           60    0.96953      1.656     1.087    0.13847
         gdp           60    0.98244      0.954    -0.101    0.54018
         exr           60    0.96807      1.736     1.189    0.11728
                                                                    
    Variable          Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
        trans          60    0.96223      2.273     1.570    0.05821
         imp          60    0.98725      0.767    -0.507    0.69389
         exp          60    0.98008      1.199     0.346    0.36453
          di          60    0.96646      2.018     1.342    0.08972
         cpi          60    0.99114      0.533    -1.202    0.88540
          ed          60    0.97711      1.377     0.612    0.27032
         gdp          60    0.98195      1.086     0.157    0.43750
         exr          60    0.96284      2.236     1.539    0.06194
                                                                   
    Variable         Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
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       _cons     .0341137   .0156003     2.19   0.033     .0028746    .0653528
          ed    -.2643653   .3592469    -0.74   0.465    -.9837449    .4550142
         cpi     .9539452   .5513129     1.73   0.089    -.1500399     2.05793
                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .440116709        59  .007459605   Root MSE        =    .08557
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0183
    Residual     .41741537        57  .007323077   R-squared       =    0.0516
       Model    .022701338         2  .011350669   Prob > F        =    0.2211
                                                   F(2, 57)        =      1.55
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        60
. reg gdp cpi ed
 
                                                                               
       _cons    -.0017687   .0041468    -0.43   0.671    -.0100726    .0065352
          di    -.0038367   .0052241    -0.73   0.466    -.0142979    .0066245
       trans    -.0259843   .0106029    -2.45   0.017    -.0472162   -.0047525
                                                                              
         exr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .065067701        59  .001102842   Root MSE        =    .03204
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0691
    Residual    .058517055        57  .001026615   R-squared       =    0.1007
       Model    .006550646         2  .003275323   Prob > F        =    0.0486
                                                   F(2, 57)        =      3.19
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        60
. reg exr trans di
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Table 3
Equation 2
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Equation 1 
                                                                               
       _cons     .0023811   .0060813     0.39   0.697    -.0097964    .0145587
          ed    -.1611133   .1400409    -1.15   0.255    -.4415404    .1193137
         cpi    -.0202973   .2149117    -0.09   0.925    -.4506506    .4100559
                                                                              
         exr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .065067701        59  .001102842   Root MSE        =    .03336
                                                   Adj R-squared   =   -0.0090
    Residual    .063429626        57    .0011128   R-squared       =    0.0252
       Model    .001638075         2  .000819037   Prob > F        =    0.4835
                                                   F(2, 57)        =      0.74
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        60
. reg exr cpi ed
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       _cons     .0257304   .0109768     2.34   0.023     .0037497    .0477111
          di      .015496   .0138285     1.12   0.267    -.0121951     .043187
       trans    -.0463965    .028066    -1.65   0.104    -.1025978    .0098048
                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .440116709        59  .007459605   Root MSE        =    .08481
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0357
    Residual    .410014631        57  .007193239   R-squared       =    0.0684
       Model    .030102077         2  .015051039   Prob > F        =    0.1328
                                                   F(2, 57)        =      2.09
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        60
. reg gdp trans di
 
                                                                               
       _cons      .002615   .0062641     0.42   0.678    -.0099491    .0151791
         imp    -.0431319   .0661985    -0.65   0.518    -.1759094    .0896455
         exp     .0320741   .0549892     0.58   0.562    -.0782202    .1423685
       trans    -.0239945   .0111017    -2.16   0.035    -.0462618   -.0017273
          di    -.0054163   .0056413    -0.96   0.341    -.0167313    .0058986
         cpi    -.0148495   .2153626    -0.07   0.945    -.4468122    .4171133
          ed    -.1409364   .1389253    -1.01   0.315    -.4195854    .1377125
                                                                              
         exr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .065067701        59  .001102842   Root MSE        =    .03272
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0293
    Residual    .056738384        53  .001070536   R-squared       =    0.1280
       Model    .008329317         6  .001388219   Prob > F        =    0.2748
                                                   F(6, 53)        =      1.30
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        60
. reg exr ed cpi di trans exp imp
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Table 7
Equation 6 
        _cons     .0251164   .0150412     1.67   0.101    -.0050524    .0552852
         imp    -.2564307   .1589553    -1.61   0.113    -.5752546    .0623933
         exp     .4058788   .1320395     3.07   0.003      .141041    .6707165
       trans    -.0333936   .0266574    -1.25   0.216    -.0868615    .0200744
          di     .0026343   .0135458     0.19   0.847    -.0245351    .0298036
         cpi      .713522   .5171267     1.38   0.173    -.3237027    1.750747
          ed    -.0999741   .3335861    -0.30   0.766    -.7690632     .569115
                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .440116709        59  .007459605   Root MSE        =    .07856
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1726
    Residual    .327137316        53  .006172402   R-squared       =    0.2567
       Model    .112979393         6  .018829899   Prob > F        =    0.0123
                                                   F(6, 53)        =      3.05
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        60
. reg gdp ed cpi di trans exp imp
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